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Introduction
Institutional theory argues that social and economic action is governed, enabled and constrained by
widely shared regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive conventions, creating stability and similarity (Scott, 2001). Over the years, research has shifted attention from the stabilizing effects of
institutions to agency and institutional change, by investigating strategic responses to institutional
pressures (Oliver, 1991), institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988) and institutional work
(Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). This work raises the issue of embedded agency (Seo & Creed,
2002): How is novel strategic action within institutions possible when actors are constrained by
those institutions? Some institutional conditions, such as institutional contradictions, afford critical
resources for strategic action (e.g. Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002). But such
institutional conditions have not yet been systematically related to repertoires of strategic action;
furthermore, this prior work on such conditions is largely limited to the macro-level of institutional
fields (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009, p. 285). In this paper we instead explore
embedded agency within the micro-institutional context of established firms, thereby building
upon the growing number of micro-level studies of institutional work (e.g., Jarzabkowski et al.,
2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).
Radical innovation provides an exemplary setting to investigate embedded agency, because it is
incommensurate with existing institutional logics. Radical technological innovation involves new
products, novel technologies and novel application areas or market segments (Gatignon, Tushman,
Smith, & Anderson, 2002; Leifer et al., 2000), thus violating prevailing practices and contradicting
institutionalized expectations about what is real, appropriate and beneficial to the organization
(e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Garud & Rappa, 1994). Institutional forces
constrain innovators in established companies to what is legitimate within existing institutional
logics and structures, thereby inhibiting radical innovation (see Christensen, 1993; Dougherty,
1992; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Yet successful radical innovations do occur within established
firms (Leifer et al., 2000). Dougherty and Heller (1994) observed that strategic actions may overcome problems of illegitimacy, but they did not explain how strategic responses emerge within
restrictive institutional structures. Hence we investigate how actors exploit micro-institutional conditions within firms in their strategic responses to legitimacy crises.
We approach this question through qualitative studies of radical technological innovation trajectories in two established high-tech companies, in which we identified 20 legitimacy crises. Our
research approach is oriented at theory elaboration (Locke, 2001; Vaughan, 1992), as we use and
extend institutional theory perspectives (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Scott, 2001),
including concepts of legitimacy and legitimation strategies (Suchman, 1995) and a structurationist
perspective on embedded agency (Giddens, 1984). We translate and extend this prior work to the
organization level, viewing the established company as a micro-institution that both enables and
constrains its members’ behavior.
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on embedded agency, showing how actors may
overcome illegitimacy within a micro-institutional context by exploiting affordances of that context. First, we differentiate between three types of micro-institutional affordances: heterogeneity,
multiplicity and ambiguity, whereas existing literature typically focused on one such condition
without clearly distinguishing them. Second, we show how radical innovators deployed four distinct strategic responses to legitimacy crises within established companies, including the strategy
to seek tolerance, which Suchman (1995) did not identify. Our findings show how these strategic
responses exploit different micro-institutional affordances, while also being constrained by regulative, normative and cognitive elements of the micro-institutional context. Third, we find that affordances
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are conditions of institutional structures that do not determine action; instead, the exploitation of
such conditions is a situated accomplishment by reflexive actors, demonstrating the vital role of
agency in realizing radical innovation.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section grounds our work in institutional literature
on innovation and embedded agency, and introduces the notion of micro-institutional affordances.
Next, we outline our research methods and the qualitative data analysis procedures, used in an
iterative dialogue between (emerging) theory and empirical data. Data about 20 legitimacy crises
that occurred in the five innovation trajectories are used to analyze the micro-institutional
affordances enabling different strategies to transcend innovative ideas’ illegitimacy. Finally, we
discuss how our findings contribute to institutional theory, embedded agency and the understanding of radical innovation in established companies.

Theoretical Background
Innovation in micro-institutions
Organizations can be viewed as micro-institutions that involve formal structures and procedures to
achieve organizational goals, and are also infused with values and vested interests (Elsbach, 2002).
Moreover, they embody understandings of social reality, organizational purpose, identity and
norms that are reproduced by organizational members (Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Ocasio, 1997;
Selznick, 1957). Organizations as micro-institutions comprise three pillars: regulative elements
regarding the establishment of rules, inspection of conformity to them, and sanctions to influence
behavior; normative elements that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension in
social life; and cultural-cognitive elements, the shared conceptions that constitute social reality and
shape meanings (Scott, 2001; Wicks, 2001). These institutional forces align the behavior of organizational agents to create enduring social structures and systems.
Recent research has investigated how innovation is both constrained and realized within organizations from a micro-institutional perspective. Vermeulen, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2007)
adopted a micro-institutional perspective to investigate why established financial services firms
struggle with their complex incremental product innovation efforts. They examined how regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive forces at the business unit level combined into institutional
templates that either enabled or inhibited incremental product innovation processes. Unsuccessful
projects were dominated by a ‘business as usual’ template, while successful projects deployed an
‘innovation’ template, which discarded standard rules and procedures, isolated innovative projects
from the organization, treated risks as part of the innovation game, and framed projects as radical
innovations. The finding that distinctive templates exist within different business units of the same
firm resonates with ambidextrous organizations separating radical innovation and the exploitation
of existing businesses (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996).
Innovating actors may also find themselves pitted against existing institutional structures,
because radical innovations often lack legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Dougherty & Heller,
1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007). Legitimacy is a
generalized perception or assumption that actions are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).
Actions or rationales are considered legitimate when perceived to correspond with institutional
elements. Dougherty and Heller (1994) found that product innovations in established firms frequently faced legitimacy crises regarding connections of new products to firm strategies and structures, collaboration across departments, and links between technological opportunities and market
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needs. Innovations that lack legitimacy may fail to acquire resources and be abandoned altogether
(Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002); such crises of legitimacy demonstrate the
constraining influence of institutions.
In this research we examine the options that actors have for responding to legitimacy problems
(Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995), which may allow innovations to proceed
despite initial lack of legitimacy (Dougherty & Heller, 1994). Drawing upon Oliver (1991), we
define a strategic response as a reaction to institutional forces that is grounded in active agency and
intended to advance particular interests. In the context of radical innovation, strategic responses by
innovating agents are intended either to augment the legitimacy of their radical innovation ideas
and activities or to continue with the radical innovation despite the legitimacy crisis.
Drawing on Suchman (1995), we distinguish three broad clusters of such strategic responses.
First, conformity strategies adapt the proposed innovation to established interests, norms and
beliefs used to evaluate the innovation. Actions and ideas thus adapted become more consistent
with established practices, and fit better into established structures (Oliver, 1991). Second, selection strategies seek another sponsor within the larger organization who accepts the proposed innovation as legitimate. Such acceptance may be based on an alternative (partly idiosyncratic)
established set of interests, norms and beliefs. Thus, rather than conforming to the demands of an
initial setting, actors attempt to relocate to a more friendly environmental niche where the ‘illegitimate’ activities are accepted (Suchman, 1995). Third, transformation strategies introduce novel
ideas to be incorporated into, merged with, or replace established interests, norms and beliefs of the
organization or organizational groups (Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Suchman, 1995), thus legitimating the innovation by changing the micro-institutional context.

Institutions and agency
This paper examines how different strategic responses may emerge within an institutional context.
Traditional interpretations of the institutional view allow little room for agents making deliberate
choices or initiating institutional change, and predict a conformity response (Scott, 2001). More
recent studies have explored how actors may engage in institutional work to create, maintain and
change institutional structures (Lawrence et al., 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), and how institutional entrepreneurs emerge, accrue agency and influence change in dominant institutional structures (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004).
This stream of work confronts the paradox of embedded agency: How can actors ‘change institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish
to change?’ (Holm, 1995, p. 398). Resolutions to this paradox should explain that actors are neither
‘cultural dopes’ who dumbly follow institutional templates (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 1) nor ‘disembedded heroes’ who are unaffected by the environment in which they operate (Battilana et al.,
2009, p. 87).
Following several institutional theorists (e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009;
Hardy & Phillips, 1999; Scott, 2001), we draw on structuration theory to conceptualize embedded
agency (Giddens, 1984). First, the duality of structure implies that social structure is both the medium
for and the consequence of action and agency. Social structure is recursively implicated in the process
of social action: it enables and constrains action, but is also reproduced and changed through social
action (Giddens, 1984). Whereas individual agents necessarily draw upon existing structures to act
and make sense of the world, they are also able to act otherwise, say no and influence the social
world, for example by enacting alternative structures. Second, reflexivity of social agents is a precondition for agency within social systems. People continually monitor actions while reflecting on their
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consequences, thus allowing for deliberate choice and agency (de Rond, 2003; Giddens, 1984).
Through processes of reflexivity, awareness and participation in multiple institutional spheres, human
agents can criticize, reframe and renegotiate established institutional fabrics to exercise agency,
despite pressures for conformity in any given setting (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).
Agency may be influenced by external shocks and the social position of entrepreneurs, and also
by institutional conditions (Battilana et al., 2009). Research in institutional theory argues that institutions can no longer be seen as monolithic, closed systems (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Townley,
2002; Zilber, 2002). Instead they are characterized by fragmentation and internal contradictions in
their regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements, which make them susceptible to social
agents’ change efforts (Dorado, 2005; Greenwood, Magán Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Hargrave &
Van de Ven, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002).
In this paper, we use the term ‘micro-institutional affordances’ to refer to those conditions of the
institutional logics and structures within organizations that actors may exploit in strategic action.
The notion of affordances does not refer to specific regulative, normative, or cultural-cognitive
institutional elements, but to configurational properties among those elements (such as contradictions) that allow action possibilities (see Gibson, 1979). The term ‘affordances’ is used because it
connotes that these properties are not determinants of behavior, but must be enacted. Furthermore,
‘affordance’ is a relational concept, indicating that these properties offer opportunities only to specific actors and strategic behaviors.
Prior studies have used multiple concepts that refer to different types of affordances – including
contradictions (Seo & Creed, 2002), competing logics (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), heterogeneity (Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009) and pluralism (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009) – but have used such
concepts rather interchangeably without theorizing similarities and distinctions, and have not
linked different strategic actions to types of affordances. Hence, we examine strategic responses to
legitimacy crises in radical innovation trajectories and the distinctive micro-institutional affordances
that enable those responses. We aim to identify the most important and strongest relations between
affordances and responses in our cases. This serves to shed light on the embedded agency of innovators within the micro-institutional context of established companies.

Methods
We adopted a qualitative research approach to elaborate theory on strategic responses to crises of
legitimacy (Strauss, 1987; Vaughan, 1992). A qualitative, inductive approach served to extend and
refine existing categories and relationships (Locke, 2001, p. 103), such as embedded agency, types
of strategic responses, and institutional conditions. Moreover, qualitative methods allowed us to
examine actors’ interpretations and their enactment of strategies and affordances. The qualitative
research procedures relied on iterative comparison and systematic coding of critical episodes along
innovation trajectories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

Research setting
Companies and innovations were selected using a theoretical sampling logic (Glaser & Strauss,
1967), to highlight radical innovation in established firms. Two European companies were selected:
PhemCo, operating in advanced chemicals; and Omega, an electronics company, in particular
OmegaSys, its medical electronics division.1 These companies were selected because they are in
dynamic industries where innovation is abundant. Further, both are established firms with a long
history and ingrained systems of belief and behavior. Moreover, both organizations are large and
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complex, with activities in many different countries and markets, and a variety of organizational
units, creating differentiated micro-institutional landscapes. Finally, each organization has a long
history in science- and technology-intensive endeavors, demonstrated in many successful products
and several groundbreaking innovations.
Omega is one of the largest European electronics companies, with more than 110,000 employees and sales in 2009 of over €23 billion. From its origins at the end of the 19th century, Omega
became one of the largest European producers in the nascent electrical industry. New technologies fueled a steady program of expansion and diversification, and today Omega includes over
60 different businesses, with over 100,000 active patents worldwide. OmegaSys, a current SBU,
provides cutting-edge equipment and technologies for the healthcare market, particularly in
medical imaging, with acquisitions in fields like digital ultrasound systems, nuclear medicine,
diagnostic cardiology, patient monitoring and multi-slice CT systems. Omega’s SBUs are supported by a corporate research organization (Omega Research), a corporate design agency
(Omega Design) and a manufacturing technology organization (Omega Applied Technologies).
PhemCo, a €7 billion European chemicals company with some 20,000 employees worldwide in
2009, ranks among the global leaders in many fields. From its beginnings as a national coal mining
company, PhemCo diversified into nitrogen fertilizers as a by-product of its mining activities; as mining ceased, PhemCo further diversified into industrial chemicals, petrochemistry, advanced synthetic
materials and fine chemistry, and privatized, eventually being listed on the stock exchange. During
the 1990s, PhemCo focused on products for the pharmaceutical and food industries, and advanced
synthetic materials for the automotive and electronics industries. From the mid 1990s PhemCo pursued rapid growth in life science products through acquisitions and joint ventures, and selective
growth in sophisticated performance materials. PhemCo relies on 1300 R&D staff worldwide.
In both companies, we sought innovations that embodied technologies or technological principles new to the company and that targeted similarly novel application areas or customers, thus
exemplifying the characteristics of radical innovations (Gatignon et al., 2002; Leifer et al., 2000).
Such radical innovations often face issues of legitimacy requiring strategic responses (Dougherty
& Heller, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Second, we wanted innovations where agents persisted despite
legitimacy crises, to be able to identify necessary conditions in a processual account of how strategic responses can overcome such crises (Mohr, 1982). Third, we focused on recent innovations that
were reaching the end of R&D, in advanced prototype development, or at the beginning of market
introduction and industrial manufacturing. Such innovation trajectories are almost complete and
thus survived institutional hazards, yet are current enough to facilitate data access and limit both
retrospective and outcomes biases.
Together with representatives of the CTO Office at each firm, we selected five innovations that
matched our criteria. Three different radical technological innovations were selected for in-depth
analysis at OmegaSys: (1) DaXo, a project on molecular medicine, which developed molecular
diagnostics equipment for sepsis; (2) Zapim, a radically new imaging technology, based on magnetic particles; and (3) Icon, a novel hospital design concept for improving patients’ experience.
Two PhemCo innovation trajectories were identified: (1) Treemax, a new class of materials based
upon dendrimers; and (2) anti-reflective coatings based upon new nanotech principles, Reflactone
and Reflactix. Table 1 describes these innovation trajectories.

Data collection
Data were collected primarily through interviews with key stakeholders in the radical innovation
process. Each radical innovation involved few innovating actors, usually four to ten people, who
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Table 1. Initial characteristics of the five investigated innovation trajectories
Project & period

Description

Novelty of technology

Novelty of application area /
customer base

DaXo
2000-2006

To grow the healthcare
division, the Board of
OmegaSys initiates a
research program at
Omega Research to
explore opportunities of
molecular medicine. DaXo
concerned a molecular
diagnostics device for
sepsis (i.e., a bacterial
infection).
Two researchers at Omega
Research invented a novel
magnetic particle imaging
principle. Zapim is a
breakthrough tomographic
imaging method potentially
capable of rapid dynamic
3D imaging of magnetic
tracer materials, promising
high imaging sensitivity and
low manufacturing costs.

Molecular diagnostics is
based upon principles of
biochemistry and molecular
biology. This differs strongly
from OmegaSys’s existing
competencies in electronics,
imaging and radiation
technology.

Application of molecular
diagnostics technology for
sepsis differed strongly
from OmegaSys’s existing
application areas like
cardiology, oncology, or
ultrasound, with different
user/customer groups in
hospitals (lab and intensive
care instead of radiology).

Zapim
2001-2006

Magnetic particle imaging
is based upon principles
of magnetic resonance,
but the technological
principle is completely
different from existing
MRI technology (zeropoint field), and OmegaSys
had little experience with
nanoparticle agents.

Icon
2001-2006

Omega Design developed
solutions at suite,
department and hospital
levels to enhance user
experiences and integrate
Omega technologies in
healthcare. Icon solutions
aim to improve patient
comfort, patient contact,
patient workflow and
personalization.

The application area of
magnetic particle imaging
was still unclear. It could be
used and integrated with
existing MRI or CT scanners
and their application areas,
or be used as real-time
dynamic 3D imaging
device during surgical
interventions, opening up
new market and application
possibilities.
Icon solutions build upon
Icon solutions also target
existing technologies of
other customer groups
OmegaSys and Omega
and decision makers
but extend this with
in hospitals than the
user experience design
traditional businesses of
and include architectural
MRI, CT and X-ray of
solutions for the
OmegaSys, and offer new
environment of MRI, CT or functionalities (patient
X-ray scanners.
comfort, contact, workflow
and personalization) to the
market.

Treemax
1994-2006

PhemCo Research
invented a hyperbranched
polymer for the Resins and
Coatings SBU, with a highly
functionalized surface.
Functionalities of Treemax
polymers enable novel
application areas such as
drug delivery and release,
synthetic enzymes, and
functional coatings.

Treemax builds upon
PhemCo’s competencies in
polymers and dendrimers,
but requires new
competencies for specific
applications (dental, paper
coatings, oilfield chemicals)
that differed strongly from
PhemCo’s competencies
in life sciences and
performance materials.

Treemax is a platform
technology that can be
applied in new areas and
markets. The three most
promising application
markets (paper coatings,
dental, and oilfield
chemicals) were new to
PhemCo’s traditional focus
on life sciences and high
performance materials.
(Continued)
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Table 1. (Continued)
Project & period

Description

Novelty of technology

Novelty of application area /
customer base

Reflactone/
Reflactix
2001-2006

The Unotech SBU asked
PhemCo Research to
work on anti-reflective
coatings for fiber-optic
materials and LCD
displays; they discovered
a nanotech system to
change the surface
topology of materials with
superior anti-reflective
characteristics and superior
manufacturability.

The Reflactone solution
builds upon established
competencies in coating
systems at PhemCo.
However, the knowledge
about nanostructured
surfaces and nanotech were
novel to PhemCo, especially
in this application area.

Two of the main application
areas of the Reflactone and
Reflactix solution platform
were picture-frame glass
and glass for solar panels.
Both application areas were
new markets for PhemCo.

could be interviewed extensively to gain reliable insights into the innovation process. For each
radical innovation, three to five stakeholders from different backgrounds were interviewed at
length: at least one person from R&D (scientists, engineers); one from a marketing/business development discipline (marketers, new business developers, sales managers); and one senior manager
with decision-making authority (e.g., research department directors, technology strategy directors,
corporate venturing and new business development directors). The first interviewees were suggested by the CTO Offices. Other stakeholders in the innovation process mentioned during interviews were interviewed too, to cross-check statements and findings. Interviewing people with
different positions and types of involvement helped offset biases or lapses (Huber & Power, 1985).
All interviews were conducted in 2005 and 2006.
Each semi-structured interview first elicited a short summary of the main events, critical decisions and conflicts of the innovation process. Next, the interview focused on issues arising from
lack of organizational support for the innovation, resistance from organizational groups, conflicts
over resource allocations, or debates over go/no-go decisions, as potential legitimacy crises. We
sought details on the reasons for the resistance, conflicts or lack of support, the positions and perspectives of the stakeholders involved, actions to resolve issues, and rationales for actions. Our
final questions addressed any issues previously identified in other interviews.
Interviews averaged 1.5 to 2 hours and were recorded and transcribed, producing about 600
pages of interview text; these were corrected by interviewees. Secondary data (e.g., project proposals, patents, presentations, articles and strategic reports) comprised 250 additional pages. We created a narrative reconstruction of each radical innovation, describing its main events and critical
issues (Langley, 1999), which was validated by interviewees. These methods produced feedback
on the data, corroboration of the observations across interviewees with different perspectives, and
triangulated interviews with secondary data to enhance reliability and reduce individuals’ potential
retrospective biases (Jick, 1979; Yin, 2003). Table 2 describes interviewees and their positions, and
the other data sources consulted.

Data analysis
Within the innovation trajectories, crises were identified that threatened the projects. Building on
Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy, events described in the interviews were coded as a
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Table 2. Interviewees and data sources
Radical innovation

Interviewees

Other data sources

DaXo*

Dr. Abbot* – senior scientist and project
leader (Omega Research)
Dr. Burton – department head molecular
medicine (Omega Research)
Dr. Newman – business developer Daxo
(OmegaSys)
Dr. Greenland – senior director
technology strategy (OmegaSys)
Dr. Petrakis – senior director software
technology (OmegaSys)
Dr. Berkovich – senior scientist and
project leader (Omega Research)
Dr. Boisson – program director medical
imaging (Omega Research)
Dr. Popper – program director medical
imaging (Omega Research)
Dr. Greenland – senior director
technology strategy (OmegaSys)
Dr. Petrakis – senior director software
technology (OmegaSys)
Dr. Eckard – marketing manager MRI
(OmegaSys)
Mr. Kingsley – program manager
Healthcare (Omega Applied Tech)
Mr. Cooper – design director Healthcare
(Omega Design)
Dr. Greenland – senior director
technology strategy (OmegaSys)
Dr. Petrakis – senior director software
technology (OmegaSys)
Dr. Morris – research project leader
(Shared Research Unit)
Dr. Sheridan – general manager
(Treemax venture)
Dr. Quinn – sales manager (Treemax
venture)
Mr. Steinbach – former director
Corporate Venture Group (Phemco)
Dr. Coleman – senior scientist and
project leader (Shared Research Unit)
Dr. Hyneman – business developer
(PhemCo)
Mr. Steinbach – Former director
Corporate Venture Group (Phemco)

Company reports (2)
Patent files (2)
Public presentations (3)

Zapim

Icon

Treemax

Reflactone/Reflactix

Scientific publications (2)
Company report
Patent file
Project proposal
Project portfolio matrix

Company reports (2)
Public presentations (2)
Project proposal

Company reports (3)
Public presentations (3)
Scientific publications (6)

Company reports (3)
Public presentations (2)
Scientific publications (3)

*All names are pseudonyms.

legitimacy crisis when (1) lack of organizational support for a radical innovation threatened the
project; and (2) this lack of organizational support arose from evaluations based on micro-institutional
criteria: that is, they (a) represented established interests, norms, beliefs, definitions, procedures,
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rules or practices attributed to the organization or its groups; (b) were socially shared among different members of the organization (they were not merely personal opinions or preferences); (c)
were perceived as obligatory (that is, individual members felt responsible to these institutionalized
criteria). Problems that did not meet these criteria were excluded from further analysis, including
technological problems and a lack of support arising from personal opinion of a senior manager.
Two coders independently applied these coding rules, as well as subsequent coding procedures, to
draw on multiple readings of all data pertaining to a crisis and to avoid premature convergence on
particular interpretations (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Pettigrew, 1990); differences were discussed
until consensus was reached. A total of 20 different legitimacy crises were identified across the five
radical innovation trajectories. These legitimacy crises formed our basic unit of analysis in this
study and were analyzed during the next phases.
A second phase of analysis involved identifying, categorizing and describing different types of strategic responses to the legitimacy crises. These responses were descriptively coded to capture the wide
variety of strategic actions. We focused on those actions that indeed had an effect on legitimacy or
enabled the innovators to continue with their innovation. These actions were compared across all legitimacy crises to identify similarities, and were initially categorized according to Suchman’s typology of
strategic responses (conformity, selection and transformation). Closer examination revealed that not all
actions matched Suchman’s type definitions, and an additional strategy type was defined (tolerance
seeking). The entire dataset was then analyzed again using this more comprehensive typology.
A third phase of analysis identified and categorized micro-institutional affordances enabling the
strategic responses to the legitimacy crises. Open coding served to identify statements in the interview texts describing aspects of established micro-institutional systems and innovation characteristics that either enabled or constrained innovators’ pursuit of a particular response. Our focus was
on actors’ reasons for choosing a strategy, and how they interpreted their institutional setting. Axial
coding compared the preliminary set of categories describing micro-institutional affordances
across all interviews and strategic response types, to identify similarities across episodes and sort
the categories of potential micro-institutional affordances and their relationships with each of the
strategies. Selective coding refined the empirically grounded typology of relevant micro-institutional
affordances, definitions and coding rules until saturation was achieved (Strauss, 1987). Table 3
contains the resulting codes, definitions and illustrative interview quotes. All crises were recoded
according to these final definitions and rules.

Findings
Figure 1 summarizes our primary findings, displaying the interactive processes between four strategic responses to legitimacy crises, the institutional context that pushes conformity, and three
types of micro-institutional affordances that may be exploited in alternative responses. The innovation’s legitimacy crisis triggers a process of reflection on micro-institutional affordances and
options for future strategic action, which results in a situated accomplishment of a particular
response, contingent on apparent affordances, innovation characteristics and actor embeddedness.
Our empirical findings add tolerance seeking as strategic response to Suchman’s conformity, selection and transformation. Tolerance seeking does not alter legitimacy per se, but enables innovating
agents to continue despite perceived illegitimacy: innovation is allowed to continue as dominant
stakeholders who represent the micro-institutional logic – whom we term institutional actors –
deliberately refrain from exercising their power to stop ‘illegitimate’ action.
Tables 4a to 4e show nine conformity responses in the total set of 21 responses (one crisis was
addressed through two distinct responses). Conformity is the response predicted by traditional
institutional theory, where institutional pressures and mechanisms foreclose agents’ options for
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Table 3. Concepts, exemplary quotes, and definitions
Concept

Exemplary quotes

Definition

Conformity

‘Now we made choices to do things closer to
PhemCo businesses, so we would have a better
connection with the current PhemCo… And
that is because of our [Board of Directors].
We didn’t choose for it ourselves… we used
to focus only on whether it was financially
attractive and as such we did the most exotic
things.’ (Treemax)
‘We did lobby a lot, at least the people from
Newman’s new business development team and
also people from Research. It really is an area we
should not miss… So much is happening, with
very large margins, and it is closer to AlphaSys
technology than most people think. Of course
you have to demonstrate that this is really true.
So we brought in people from the field, external
experts with their stories.’ (DaXo)

Where radical innovation ideas and
proposed actions are adapted to be
consistent with established interests,
norms and beliefs as used in the
evaluation of legitimacy, the radical
innovation exhibits conformity.

Transformation

Selection

‘It has been a quest for supporters and funds
by Maddox and the people that believed in this
technology. They wanted to find someone who
understands what they are doing and who has
access to funds. And that’s how they found me.’
(Reflactone)

Seeking
tolerance

‘So Treemax stayed alive… and we are drifting
on this wave of innovation. But still the question
why we are doing it, is not answered.’ ‘In 2004
it could have crashed. But it didn’t, because it
didn’t hurt. If we wouldn’t have enough sales to
pay for those 2.5 people, then it certainly would
have crashed.’ (Treemax project)

Ambiguity

‘We are not only a hardware company, but we
have also worked for years with fluids in other
technologies… a LCD display also contains
fluids. That are also very small amounts of fluids
and we are pretty good at that.’ (DaXo)

Where innovating actors
successfully introduce novel
interests, norms and beliefs that
better legitimate the radical
innovation and proposed course
of action, these are incorporated
in, and merged with or replace
prior established interests, norms
and beliefs of the organization or
its groups. As such, established
interests, norms and beliefs adapt to
the radical innovation.
The innovating actors seek out a
more favorable group within the
organization, for which the radical
innovation and its proposed course
of action are more legitimate.
Selection of a more accepting locus
moves the innovation into this
alternative (partly idiosyncratic)
established set of interests, norms
and beliefs.
Innovating actors appeal to the
benign neglect or tolerance of
institutional actors for whom the
radical innovation lacks legitimacy.
The institutional actors deliberately
allow the radical innovation to
continue, despite its illegitimacy,
requiring no adaptations to either
the radical innovation, or to the
established interests, norms and
beliefs.
Institutionalized interests, norms
and beliefs are ambiguous where
different interpretations of
particular institutional interests,
norms and beliefs coexist or
conflict; or when the meaning of
such interests, norms and beliefs is
vague or inconsistent.
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Concept

Exemplary quotes

Definition

Multiplicity

‘So the whole innovation cycle started up
again… Peyton [from the Board of Directors]
also realized, hey ‘innovation’ that might be
important to the company… and maybe we
even want a lot of innovation, even more than
we are doing now. And we need new areas and
maybe we could use this Treemax in that…’
(Treemax)
‘So we came to better understanding of
the thought world of Omega Design. From
an engineering background … that’s really
something different. We [Omega Applied
Technologies] focus on technical realization,
and Design is focused on shapes and
appearances.’ (Icon)

Multiplicity refers to several
simultaneous alternative institutional
interests, norms and beliefs that
coexist within the same institutional
logic.

Heterogeneity

Heterogeneity of institutional
context is defined as the existence
of multiple institutional constituents
(i.e., established organizational
groups) within an organization
that maintain differentiated sets of
established interests, norms and
beliefs (e.g. distinct SBUs).

micro-institutional logic and structure
micro-institutional affordances
multiplicity

enact
adapt

heterogeneity

innovation
characteristics
scope
resource impact
radicalness

ambiguity

afford constrain
enable

strategic responses
seeking tolerance

selection

transformation

conformity

facilitate
actor characteristics
social position
social skills

Figure 1. Micro-institutional affordances and strategic responses
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change. Micro-institutional pressures toward conformity can strongly regulate innovators’ behavior, compelling major adaptations of radical ideas, project postponement, or even cancellation, and
thus possibly reducing the innovators’ initial enthusiasm and commitment. However, more than
half of the legitimacy crises were addressed through alternative responses: transformation (six
times), selection (three times) and seeking tolerance (three times). How were these alternative
strategic responses possible when institutional theory predicts conformity?
Figure 1 displays three distinctive types of micro-institutional affordances that were exploited
in alternatives to conformity. Heterogeneity of the institutional system refers to the presence of
different institutional constituents within an organization, with discrete sets of established interests, norms and beliefs, based on different tasks, background or contacts (e.g., different divisions
or departments) (see Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009, p. 39). Heterogeneity within an institutional
system offers innovators an array of potential sponsor groups within the organization; the radical
innovation idea may be more legitimate for some of these groups than others. Multiplicity of an
institutional logic refers to the coexistence of multiple alternative interests, norms and beliefs
within the same institutional logic. Multiplicity may result in inconsistent implications, similar to
competing demands (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009), yet within a single logic. This differentiates multiplicity from heterogeneity, which concerns groups with partly idiosyncratic institutionalized logics. The coexistence of alternative institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs offers innovating
agents opportunities to manipulate or induce shifts in their ranking, or to appeal to alternatives.
Finally, the ambiguity of micro-institutional interests, norms and beliefs offers innovating agents
options to overcome conformity pressures and illegitimacy. Ambiguity arises where different interpretations conflict or where meanings of institutional interests, norms and beliefs are vague or
inconsistent (March & Olsen, 1976). The difference between ambiguity and multiplicity is that
with ambiguity the meanings and interpretations are vague or inconsistent, whereas with multiplicity meanings are clear, but are competing, conflicting or have inconsistent implications. Tables 4a
to 4e display strategic responses and micro-institutional conditions for all legitimacy crises in each
radical innovation trajectory. We explain and illustrate how each type of strategic response exploited
a specific type of micro-institutional affordance.

Micro-institutional affordances and transformation
A major legitimacy crisis that threatened the Treemax innovation at PhemCo was overcome by a
transformation strategy, exploiting ambiguity in the institutional context to enhance the innovation’s legitimacy. In 2006, the Treemax venture team sought support from the Board of Directors
of PhemCo and upper management of its Innovation Centre to pursue Treemax opportunities in the
oilfield chemicals and paper chemicals markets. However, the Board of Directors had designated
other target markets for innovation, and Treemax’s application areas did not match either future
goals or established interests, creating a legitimacy crisis. Difficulty was exacerbated because the
Board of Directors and the Treemax venture team were using different logics: the Treemax team
argued from technology push and strategic fit with technological competencies, while the Board of
Directors instead emphasized market-pull innovation in envisioning future new businesses for
PhemCo. This deepened the legitimacy crisis because the parties used conflicting rationales and
concepts to evaluate the Treemax innovation.
The Treemax venture team demonstrated partial conformity to some of the Board’s concerns
(e.g., by increasing focus on application areas closer to established PhemCo businesses). More
importantly, innovators also sought to influence upper management to redefine PhemCo in a
broader business area, functional polymers (of which Treemax is an application). PhemCo’s
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Table 4a. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for DaXo
Legitimacy crisis

Key micro-institutional
affordances

Strategic response

2000 Q3
A new way of thinking and
working (i.e., biology) was
less legitimate with respect
to the established way of
thinking and developing
technological solutions
based on the dominant logic
of physics, electronics and
engineering.

Ambiguity
Application of the established
procedures and norms to the
‘biologist’s way of working’ did
not lead to satisfactory results,
thus rendering ambiguous
the applicability of established
procedures and norms.

Transformation
Adapting established ways of
working to incorporate the novel
‘biologist’s way of working’ gave
the biologists more room for
experimentation.

2003 Q1
Developing a novel
competency in biochemistry
for DaXo is not legitimate
with respect to OmegaSys’s
identity as an ‘electronics’
company.

Ambiguity
Paradigm changes and industry
shifts called into question
the consistency and fitness
of established views of
organizational identity.

Transformation
Popularizing a new industry
model and a pioneering role for
the company in merging bio- and
hardware technologies better
legitimates the new competency.

2003 Q1
Developing a novel
competency in ‘fluids’ was
not legitimate with respect
to OmegaSys’s identity
as a ‘hardware’ company,
nor did established groups
think that a ‘hardware’
company could excel in a
‘fluids’ competency (‘we
don’t want to get wet’).
Thus developing this new
competency was seen as
high risk.

Ambiguity
Presenting facts that question the
established view of organizational
identity: ‘we are not only a
hardware company, but we have
also worked for years with fluids
in other technologies’.

Transformation
Demonstrating the relatedness
and familiarity of novel
competency with past
achievements and reframing
organizational identity
accordingly; further, stimulating
novel interests by demonstrating
the benefits of integrating the
new competency with previously
acknowledged competencies.

2003 Q3
DaXo, a ‘diagnostic’
technology, is not legitimate
in the established view of
OmegaSys as an ‘imaging’
company, and does not build
upon or directly relate to
existing product lines.
2004 Q3
The DaXo team’s need for
fast, flexible and empowered
decision making was not
legitimate within the
context of the established
procedures, formalities and
norms at OmegaSys.

Ambiguity
A novel and ambiguous concept
of the ‘total care cycle’ generates
ongoing strategic discussions.

Transformation
Adoption of the total care
cycle redefines and extends
OmegaSys’s potential business
areas, to include diagnostic
technologies.

Conformity
Compliance with the established
procedures and norms for budget
approval and personnel hiring
within the company.
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Table 4b. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Zapim
Legitimacy crisis

Key micro-institutional
affordances

Strategic response

2004 Q1
Zapim as an independent
technology and new
business was not legitimate
with respect to commonly
held interpretations of
appropriate innovation as
only ‘variants’ of already
existing MRI technology.

Ambiguity
Confusion about whether the
Zapim innovation was a variant of
the established ‘MRI technology’ is
used to initiate transformation.

Transformation
The Zapim team popularize a
new label, ‘imaging tracer,’ for
particular components of the
technology to make a clear
distinction between the ‘old’
and ‘new’ technology.

2005 Q2
Integrating Zapim with
existing MRI technology and
commercializing it through
the related business unit
was not legitimate with
respect to established
(‘financial performance’)
goals and responsibilities
of the MR business unit.
The required investment
in Zapim did not help the
business unit achieve its
performance targets in the
short term.
2005 Q4
Continuation with research
and development on Zapim
was not legitimate in the
face of established goals
and responsibilities (‘focus
on high performance
targets and core business’)
at the Technology Office
of OmegaSys, and did not
match the established
criteria and models for
technology funding (the
‘business potential’ logic)
in use.

Conformity
The SBUs of OmegaSys in the
end decide about the funding
of ‘contract research’ projects.
Integrating Zapim technology
with existing MRI technology is
abandoned, and the innovators
decide to wait until a later
stage, when technical risks
are smaller and circumstances
at the business unit more
favorable.

Heterogeneity
OmegaSys had multiple sales
organizations and multiple
business units. OmegaSys had a
dedicated CTO Office. Omega
had a large Research department
with multiple research groups and
a total of four different technology
incubators.

Selection
After a search process an
alternative source of funding is
negotiated with the Research
department itself. The idea for
the technology development
satisfied the funding criteria for
a ‘lab venture,’ and matched
Research department interests.
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Table 4c. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Icon
Legitimacy crisis

Key micro-institutional affordances

2004 Q2
Investing in Icon did not match
with the established interests
of senior management and
their dominant focus on
maximizing short-term business
profitability and shareholder
value.

2004 Q3
Icon was not consistent
with the established market
approach and the value
proposition of the existing
business unit, and thus Icon
was not legitimate with respect
to its established interests and
goals.

Strategic response
Conformity
Final decision-making authority
for all innovation projects
resides with the CEO and Board
of Management of OmegaSys.
The innovators complied with
the concerns and established
interests of the CEO and senior
management and the Icon project
was put on hold till a later stage
and budgets were recalled.

Heterogeneity
OmegaSys had multiple sales
organizations and multiple business
units. OmegaSys had a dedicated
CTO Office. There were several
cross business unit networks and
cross product division networks.
Omega consisted of several
different product divisions and staff
departments relevant to Icon.

Selection
After a search process, an
alternative patron (corporate
marketing executive/CMO) is
found to sponsor the initiative,
whose matching interests and
shared view of company’s future
rendered Icon legitimate.

2005 Q3
The multilevel aspects of
Icon (including hospital-level
solutions) did not match
established business scope
definitions of individual
business units, and various
Icon components transgressed
established business
boundaries, responsibilities
and interests. Thus Icon was
illegitimate because it was not
beneficial to the individual
business units.

Conformity
The SBUs of OmegaSys decide on
the funding of their development
projects and what is needed.
Consequently, Omega Design
adapted the radical Icon ideas
to match individual business
unit boundaries, scopes and
interests. Most multilevel aspects/
components were cancelled.

2005 Q4
The Icon ideas are based on
‘user experiences,’ but this
worldview is not legitimate in
the established and dominant
‘technology driven’ worldview
of engineers and technical
product developers at the hightech company.

Conformity
Omega Design is viewed as service
unit to the SBU clients and the
SBUs in the end decide on funding
development projects and decide
on what is necessary and needed.
Consequently, some ‘experience’based aspects of Icon are cancelled
or adapted to meet technical,
financial and timing constraints
dictated by the dominant groups’
‘technology driven’ logic of
‘engineering’ at the SBU.
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Table 4d. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Treemax
Legitimacy crisis

Key micro-institutional
affordances

Strategic response

1994 Q2
Because the Treemax research project
did not produce short-term positive
results, it was seen as a highly uncertain
project which did not match established
norms for SBU R&D projects. Nor
did it match with the business unit’s
established interests and needs, or
contribute to short-term business goals.

Multiplicity
The innovation serves
longer-term business
interests of the SBU,
although short-term
research and economic
results are not positive.

Tolerance seeking
SBU management allows the
research project to continue despite
negative short-term results and
misfit with established norms for
application research projects. Part of
the funding of the project came from
a government R&D subsidy which
reduced the financial burden.

1998 Q1
Development projects for the Treemax
technology were proposed for
numerous promising application areas.
These had a long-term focus, and did
not align with established immediate
business unit interests or issues.

Conformity
The Management team of the
SBU controls the SBU budget for
application R&D and decides on
funding. Consequently, the Treemax
team adapted their plans to focus
on only one potential application
area better suited to the SBU. As
such, they conformed to established
shorter-term interests.

2001 Q3
The dental care application of the
Treemax technology (a low volume,
specialty chemicals business) was not
legitimate with respect to PhemCo’s
identity and competencies as a ‘bulk
chemical’ company.

Conformity
The Treemax team complied with
the concerns and cancelled the ideas
for Treemax dental applications.

2003 Q4
The Treemax venture was no
longer legitimate with respect to the
established interests and goals of the
company. It was not seen as strategic or
relevant to the longer-term strategy and
realization of growth goals of PhemCo.

Multiplicity
Treemax was depicted as
strengthening the corporate
image of ‘being an innovative
company’ although it did not
directly contribute to the
growth goals of PhemCo.

Tolerance seeking
The strategic relevance and fit of
Treemax with PhemCo remain weak,
but the Board of Directors and
top management of the Innovation
Centre seeking an innovation allowed
the venture to continue.

2006 Q2
The Treemax venture is not aligned
with the longer-term strategic goals
of PhemCo, since its target business
areas do not match the designated
end-markets defined by upper
management.Treemax proponents
reason from ‘technology push’ and
‘fit with technological competencies,’
an approach that conflicted with
the established patterns of ‘fit with
end-markets’ and ‘market-driven
innovation’ of upper management at
PhemCo and its business units.

Ambiguity
The still ambiguous but
generally supported future
vision for PhemCo as a
‘specialty chemical company’
offers opportunities for
transformation.

Transformation
Innovative actors popularize new
ways of thinking about the future
vision of the company, positioning
the Treemax venture as a prime
example of future business models
and competencies. As such, they
stimulate new ways of thinking and
new interests. Additionally:

(Continued)
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Table 4d. (Continued)
Legitimacy crisis

Key micro-institutional
affordances

Strategic response
Conformity
The Board of Directors of PhemCo
pushed the Treemax team to
align their plans better. The Board
had decision-making power and
controlled the budgets for new
strategic initiatives. Consequently,
the Treemax team adapted their
business plans to improve alignment
with the established and designated
end-markets of PhemCo and their
typical customer needs.

Table 4e. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Reflactone/Reflactix
Legitimacy crisis

Key micro-institutional
affordances

Strategic response

2002 Q4
The project on anti-reflective
coatings was illegitimate with
respect to the established
interests of a business unit
focused on safeguarding their
position in their current
business under stress.

Heterogeneity
At Phemco multiple product
divisions and business units were
present and relevant to Reflactone.
Phemco also has a dedicated
Venturing & Business Development
unit and a Shared Research Unit.

Selection
Search for alternative internal
sponsors. After reframing and
broadening the innovative idea’s
scope and aims (repositioning
it as a technology platform with
many different application areas),
it matched well with the interests
of the Venture and Business
Development unit, who agreed to
sponsor the project.

2003 Q3
One of the applications of the
technology (‘Reflactone’) was
not legitimate with respect
to the established interests of
PhemCo because it offered high
risks, little growth opportunity
and few synergies with
established businesses.
2005 Q4
The Reflactix application
(selling glass with anti-reflective
coating) was not legitimate with
respect to PhemCo’s identity of
a ‘chemicals’ company. Reflactix
did not match with established
interests of existing business
units of PhemCo. It has little fit
and low synergy with existing
businesses of the company.

Conformity
After extensive analysis of the
business potential of Reflactone
in the electronic display market,
the innovators agreed to meet
the interests and concerns of the
Board of PhemCo and licensed
Reflactone out to a former
technology partner.
Multiplicity
Reflactix strengthens the
corporate image of ‘being an
innovative company’ although
it does not fit with existing
businesses of PhemCo. Moreover,
the innovation might become
strategic in the future.

Tolerance seeking
Although Reflactix remained
‘strange’ with respect to
established views of PhemCo’s
identity, and had little synergy and
fit with established businesses,
upper management decided to
allow the innovation to continue.
Low investments were needed
to set up the pilot plant and the
potential rewards could be high.
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espoused strategic goal, to move from bulk chemicals to specialty chemicals, favored more innovative, tailored products with higher profit margins. However, the Board was vague about what
‘becoming a specialty chemical company’ actually meant. The Treemax team showcased Treemax
as an exemplar of specialty chemicals, a novel business model offering new revenue streams. The
Treemax team embedded new perspectives and redefined interests into the existing micro-institutional
logic to legitimize their radical innovation ideas. This response can be characterized as a transformation strategy.
Treemax business developer Sheridan described the circumstances that enabled a transformation strategy, emphasizing the role of ambiguity, as follows:
So you can’t escape the question how to proceed in the future? What is its raison d’ètre, why should we
do it? The business model is that we have a product-technology platform and we should bring it to the
market. And then we see clear examples in the industry that do just that, and those are the specialty
polymer companies. And we have as an ambition to realize that for PhemCo in the next five or ten years.
We see the Treemax technology as a valuable component in this process … And PhemCo has stated in its
2005 and 2010 strategy that we want to be a specialty company. Well, what does that mean? And we are
currently shaping and filling this in. Because these are not precise directives from the top, no, these are just
broad guidelines in the end …. Slowly people start to realize that a specialty business consists of connecting
and combining smaller clusters of revenues of product/market combinations in a very smart way … instead
of what we are used to do in the coal and mining business, or petrochemical business, or the nylon business.

Sheridan’s comments articulate a new vision of PhemCo as a specialty chemical company, making
concrete an idea that was previously vague and unspecific, although supported by dominant groups
and mentioned in PhemCo’s formal strategic plans and goals. The open-ended ambiguity of
PhemCo’s vision enabled innovators to portray Treemax and functional polymers as exemplary
templates for becoming a specialty chemicals company, thereby redefining PhemCo’s future in
terms of Treemax capabilities.
Ambiguity enabled the Treemax team to transform institutionalized visions, redefining an
accepted idea by linking it to their radical innovation, to significantly augment their venture’s
legitimacy. Widely shared but loosely defined ideas about organizational identity and established
strategic roles allowed innovators to translate the notion of ‘a specialty chemicals company’ into
Treemax’s situation, to offer alternative institutional models, and initiate transformation. The
meaning of prevailing institutional interests, norms and beliefs was vague, implicit and open to
multiple interpretations – in other words, ambiguous (March & Olsen, 1976). Such ambiguity
affords innovating agents opportunities to influence established micro-institutional structures and
logics to the benefit of radical innovation ideas.

Micro-institutional affordances and selection
A major legitimacy crisis affecting the Reflactone innovation project, pursued by the Shared
Research Unit of PhemCo, illustrates the selection strategy to seek more favorable oases within a
heterogeneous institutional setting. PhemCo Unotech SBU sponsored a research project that identified interesting growth opportunities for Reflactone. However, an economic downturn in
Unotech’s primary business led to elimination of all activities not directly contributing to immediate survival, and Reflactone’s mismatch with both established interests and immediate urgencies of
the business unit generated a legitimacy crisis in 2002.
In response, the director of the Shared Research Unit, Dr. Maddox, actively searched for
new sponsors within PhemCo. He found a backer in the director of PhemCo’s Venturing and
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Business Development Group (V&BD), Mr. Steinbach, who saw Reflactone as a very promising potential contributor to a specialty chemicals future. However, Steinbach was not willing
to fund the project’s initially limited focus on anti-reflective coatings for display applications.
When Maddox explained that Reflactone could support all kinds of functional coating systems
with many different properties and potential applications, some closely related to existing
PhemCo businesses, this broader focus matched very well with the ambitions of Steinbach and
the V&BD group. Maddox’s search for new sponsors within PhemCo is an example of a selection strategy.
A closer look reveals characteristics of the micro-institutional context and the innovators’ positions that enabled a selection strategy. Maddox, director of the Shared Research Unit (SRU),
enjoyed easy access to a variety of organizational groups. As Steinbach noted:
It has been a quest for supporters and funds by Maddox and the people who believed in this technology.
They wanted to find someone who understands what they are doing and who has access to funds. And
that’s how they found me. And I must say, I can get along very well with Maddox. We agree on a lot of
things… And he is a great guy, a real gentleman, who really has a vision and is determined.

As director of SRU, Maddox was responsible for most research activities within PhemCo (both
contract research for the different business units and exploratory research projects), so he maintained working relationships with all SRU research groups, with development groups at the product divisions and business units, with management teams of the business units, and with the
corporate planning staff as well as the PhemCo Innovation Centre, representing an array of multiple and diverse potential sponsors. The existence of diverse groups and networks within an organization supports selection strategies: PhemCo business units operate in very different industries and
deploy distinctive technology platforms, each with their own experiences and identities (e.g.,
Unotech’s Coatings and Resins, and the Performance Materials SBU, as well as the SRU). PhemCo
even has a specific business unit (the V&BD group) supporting novel business and technology
initiatives. This multitude of organizational groups sustained differentiated (and partly idiosyncratic) sets of micro-institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs, offering innovating actors many
alternative sponsors to select.

Micro-institutional affordances and tolerance seeking
Tolerance-seeking strategies amount to finding a niche of benign neglect where progress can continue despite a legitimacy crisis. The Reflactone innovators encountered a further legitimacy crisis
when, at a later stage, they proposed a novel business model, an example illuminating the dynamics of micro-institutional circumstances and innovators’ actions to maneuver their radical innovation into a tolerant pocket of their micro-institutional system.
After the Reflactone research team developed an anti-reflective coating system for glass, they
advocated commercialization by PhemCo applying the anti-reflective coating on pre-manufactured
glass themselves. This approach was expected to increase profit margins significantly, compared to
selling or licensing out the anti-reflective coating. However, this would be a completely new business model for PhemCo, moving the company up the value chain in a new business and new market, based on a novel technology. In 2005 this resulted in a conflict between different views of
organizational identity and a poor fit with existing interests of PhemCo’s established business. As
Dr. Hyneman, a business developer, noted:
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PhemCo is not used to this type of business. It is very strange that a chemical company would handle glass
now. That is something weird.

The idea of selling glass conflicted with the established view of what PhemCo as a chemical company is and does, its organizational identity. Since PhemCo’s established businesses centered on
producing and selling chemical raw materials (e.g., coatings) in business-to-business markets, the
new business model was perceived to be a strategic misfit, with limited synergy with PhemCo’s
established businesses.
People at PhemCo and the Innovation Centre still considered selling glass a misfit with the
established corporate identity, and major doubts about this strategic extension remained. The Innovation
Centre management ultimately allowed the Reflactone team to proceed, despite the unresolved
legitimacy crisis however, since both the Centre and the Board also wanted to demonstrate
PhemCo’s ability to innovate beyond its established footprint. We characterize this response as a
tolerance seeking strategy, where innovating actors appeal to mixed institutionalized interests and
beliefs, even though their course of action is not fully legitimate within the prevailing microinstitutional logic.
The multiplicity of micro-institutional interests and beliefs supported the innovators’ toleranceseeking strategy. Reflactone’s project leader described it as follows:
There are two reasons for [letting the Reflactone team continue with their plans] I think … The first one
that I am pretty sure about is that PhemCo’s history of successfully commercializing its own technology
in new markets is fairly limited. In the last 20 years, if you look at the new products in performance
materials I can think of two or three … So, three new products in 20 years. So there is a real commitment
of top management to show to our investors that we are capable of doing new stuff.

Despite the conflict, top management was eager to demonstrate PhemCo’s innovation capability
to its shareholders. Thus, different goals and beliefs coexisted (and competed) within the same
micro-institutional logic. Innovators can exploit this multiplicity to shift preferences, altering the
hierarchy of established goals and beliefs to favor innovation. Here, illegitimate actions are
allowed to continue because innovation can be advocated in view of long-term goals, albeit at the
expense of short-term consistency. Actors representing the mainstream micro-institutional logic
can reasonably conclude that full consistency with some important established interests and
beliefs would contradict others. Innovating agents can appeal to this multiplicity, encouraging
institutional actors to trade off different interests or rank them differently, justifying tolerance of
(partly) illegitimate actions.

Enacting affordances and selecting responses
The previous sections explained how strategic responses are enabled by enacting particular types
of micro-institutional affordances. Tables 4a to 4e display two intriguing phenomena that call for
further explanation. First, multiple strategic responses were used at different moments within a
single innovation trajectory, but there is no apparent pattern in the sequence of strategies over
time. Second, this variety of strategic responses is even larger within the same organization: all
strategic responses were observed at PhemCo, and all responses, except seeking tolerance, were
found at OmegaSys. But why did those involved in different radical innovation projects in the
same company, or even within the same project, enact their micro-institutional environment in
such different ways?
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First, affordances are content-specific and must be enacted in strategic responses; they are not
causal drivers nor generically available resources for any issue of legitimacy. Ambiguity, heterogeneity and multiplicity arise from specific institutionalized norms and beliefs that may be relevant
for one legitimacy crisis, but not for another. Moreover, actors must perceive these affordances and
envision their potential relevance to enact them. This relevance may differ from legitimacy crisis
to legitimacy crises because rather distinct crises emerged over time, exhibiting the unpredictable
nature of innovation journeys (see Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999). For example, the DaXo project at OmegaSys resolved its first four legitimacy crises through transformation
responses, exploiting different ambiguities, some of which were purposefully created. Developing
a competency in ‘biochemistry’ was illegitimate within OmegaSys as an ‘electronics’ firm, so
innovating actors ambiguated this organizational identity, by pointing out how other ‘electronics’
firms were blurring those boundaries. In another crisis, Omega’s ‘imaging company’ identity was
constraining, so the novel and still ambiguous concept of the ‘total care cycle’ was used to initiate
transformation. Thus, ambiguity may concern different aspects of the micro-institutional environment; a particular ambiguity does not pertain to every legitimacy crises. For the last legitimacy
crises faced by DaXo, no ambiguity or any other affordance could be exploited, and a conformity
response was chosen instead. An intrinsic connection between affordances and responses needs to
be crafted for every crisis in each innovation trajectory.
Second, enactment of affordances and selection of responses also depend on innovation characteristics, including resource impact, scope and radicalness. These characteristics may be purposefully adjusted to enable seeking tolerance, selection or conformity responses; a successful
transformation strategy most often preserved the original radical innovation ideas. Relatively low
resource impact of a radical innovation encourages innovating actors to seek (and institutional
actors to grant) institutional tolerance, because resources need not be withdrawn from other initiatives. Although Treemax had little fit with established interests and strategy of PhemCo, the innovation team resolved their fourth legitimacy crisis by appealing to the multiplicity of established
interests to seek tolerance and by cutting back the required budget for Treemax considerably. As
Dr. Sheridan, general manager of Treemax, stated:
So if you want to know how I solved it? By disappearing under the blanket and putting down the
performance. Just trim down and show them that we are right. And what happened is that we went back
from 10 to about three employees… and we have proven something in only one market segment during
that year, and the rest we kept alive, literally.

Low resource impact favors innovators’ use of multiplicity to seek tolerance because it does not
force trade-offs against other projects. Resource impact is partially adjustable; innovators can
reduce resource impact to expand opportunities for tolerance within a micro-institutional regime.
Further, a radical innovation’s scope is related to its potential appeal: narrowly construed innovations will appeal to fewer constituencies, while more broadly defined innovations potentially interest
more institutional sponsors. Consequently, the apparent heterogeneity accessible to innovators to overcome a legitimacy crisis depends on the scope of the innovation itself. Sometimes innovators must
reframe their radical innovation idea to highlight its match with alternative, more diverse institutional
subgroups’ interests. Steinbach mentioned this response in one of the interviews on Reflactone:
There was some kind of dream that if we, as a specialty company of the future, could put very thin layers
on all kinds of materials so that you could still see through the material, and that we could also add unique
properties to it, then we are doing the right thing for the new PhemCo. And then I said I want to fund this
research from the Venturing and Business Development group, because I really think this is an opportunity…
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and I see this much broader than only anti-reflection. … [the ideas to broaden the scope] existed already.
Also Maddox had thought extensively about it. But you know that when you work in a large company, you
should not come up with too fuzzy concepts, because these usually don’t stand a chance. But you have to
keep them at hand, so that you can play that card at the right moment.

Broadening Reflactone’s scope into multiple application areas aligned it with the V&BD unit’s
interests; a more narrowly focused application scope clearly held appeal for fewer institutional
subgroups.
Finally, some strategic responses adapt the radicalness of an innovation. In particular, conformity responses required that plans and ideas were adapted to better match established logics
and structures. None of the conformity responses that were observed abandoned the project altogether; instead they changed ideas into something less radical than initially envisioned, to enable
innovators to continue with some of their innovative ideas. Omega Design developed the Icon
concept to include design solutions and technologies at room, department and hospital levels to
improve patients’ experiences throughout the whole healthcare process. Because Icon’s multimode approach transgressed traditional boundaries of MR and CT systems, it did not make sense
to the OmegaSys business units, nor did Icon fit into any of their existing systems. The resulting
legitimacy crisis, in 2005, threatened the further development of Icon, because SBUs were not
willing to fund this project. Failing to convince the division marketing management to create a
new organizational group for department- and hospital-level Icon solutions, Omega designers
eventually decided to accommodate to the existing interests and boundary definitions of the
SBUs. They focused on developing discrete Icon options for the MR suite and for the CT suite,
abandoning multilevel Icon solutions that targeted other customer groups and decision makers in
hospitals. Thus, Icon’s innovators adapted their ideas to the established logic and structures, overcoming their legitimacy crisis by conformity. As long as the innovation is not compromised too
much, conformity also supports the larger institutional frame, in return for legitimacy and support
from established institutional groups.
Third, the enactment of affordances is facilitated by the social position of innovating actors (see
Battilana, 2006), and their social skills (see Fligstein, 1997). Some actors see what others cannot;
some communicate better than others; others still are better in maneuvering in political space or
develop better ideas to adapt their innovation. Some of the differences in responses between (and
within) projects in the same firm can be explained by differences in the social positions of the
innovating actors involved in those projects. The Treemax team had a boundary spanning position
within PhemCo that rendered them more aware and critical of ambiguity. As a relatively independent venture unit (supported by PhemCo’s Innovation Centre), innovators were loosely coupled to
the rest of the PhemCo organization, and active in a novel business field. Thus, the Treemax team
was more receptive to alternative opportunities than insiders wedded to PhemCo’s prior businesses. Similarly, exploiting heterogeneity of an institutional system to find alternative sponsors is
easier for innovating agents occupying boundary-spanning positions, who are exposed to multiple
subgroups and have extensive networks providing access to alternative viewpoints and information
(Tushman & Scanlan, 1981).
The difference between the response to the second and third Zapim legitimacy crises can be
explained by the power of an internal sponsor, who had come to support the project in the meantime. The second legitimacy crisis was resolved by a conformity strategy, while the third legitimacy crisis was overcome by a selection response. During the second crisis, the innovation team
working on the Zapim technology lobbied for support from the SBU MRI for which they normally work. The small innovation team, a young project leader and two senior scientists relatively
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new to the company, was unable to gain support from the MRI SBU, but their limited organizational network offered few options. By the time of the third legitimacy crisis, the head of their
research department supported Zapim and leveraged his good connections with both the CTO
Office of OmegaSys and within Omega Research itself for alternative sources of funding and
organizational support.
Every enactment of an affordance to enable a strategic response to a legitimacy crisis is a situated accomplishment, crafting an intricate connection between what is at stake in the legitimacy
crises and the specific content of the affordance. This accomplishment involves shaping innovation
characteristics and depends on innovating actors’ social positions and skills. As a consequence,
different affordances are enacted and different responses are pursued to overcome legitimacy crises, even within the same project or the same organization.

Discussion and Conclusion
Established institutional logics and structures are relatively stable over time and exert constraining effects on innovating agents, but they also provide potential resources to overcome legitimacy problems associated with radical innovation. Vermeulen et al. (2007) found that regulatory,
normative and cultural-cognitive forces combined into distinct institutional templates that were
either conducive or inhibitive to incremental service innovations; and Dougherty and Heller
(1994) observed how radical innovations were at odds with existing institutional templates. But
we find that the institutional forces that render radical innovation as illegitimate, at the same
time offer affordances that can be exploited to advance actions not initially countenanced as
legitimate. Our empirical findings on such micro-institutional affordances explain why and how
a variety of strategic responses to overcome legitimacy crises can arise within a single microinstitutional system.
First of all, our findings offer a differentiated perspective on conditions that may be exploited in
strategic responses to legitimacy crises. Our analysis of strategic responses confirms the insight
from institutional theory that institutional forces push innovating actors toward conformity (Scott,
2001). A central tenet of our findings, however, is that heterogeneity, multiplicity and ambiguity
afford alternative paths for those pioneering radical innovations. A heterogeneous institutional
context provides an array of differentiated institutionalized groups, for some of whom the radical
innovation idea may be more legitimate, thus enabling a selection strategy. The multiplicity of
institutional interests, norms and beliefs constitutes an array of conflicting demands, enabling
innovating actors to appeal to those demands best corresponding to their radical innovation and
seek tolerance for its lack of correspondence with other institutional demands. Ambiguity of microinstitutional interests, norms and beliefs offers innovating agents opportunities to propagate novel
interpretations, transforming the institutional system to favor the innovation. Other scholars have
used a range of related concepts (e.g., Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009)
but without explicitly differentiating them. Thus, we provide a more comprehensive and differentiated perspective on conditions for agency within institutional systems. Moreover, whereas the
institutional literature has identified conditions that support agency in general (e.g., Battilana &
d’Aunno, 2009), we identify connections between specific affordances and distinct strategies to
overcome pressures toward stability. These connections should not be interpreted as deterministic
or causal links between affordance and response, but rather are both part of a dynamic process of
reflection and action triggered by a legitimacy crisis. Neither are these connections exclusive; we
have identified the strongest links between affordances and strategies, but more than one affordance
can be enacted and elements of more than one type of strategy may be combined or deployed
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consecutively during an interactive and iterative process. The response to the last legitimacy crisis
of Treemax, for example, showed how transformation and conformity were combined.
Second, our findings contribute to an enhanced understanding of embedded agency as called for
in recent publications (Lawrence et al., 2009). Whereas the institutional entrepreneurship literature
has been criticized for over-voluntaristic assumptions regarding agency (Battilana et al., 2009), our
analysis shows that innovating actors were not ‘disembedded heroes,’ but highly contextualized
actors. Building upon the structurationist concepts of duality of structure and reflexivity, we argue
instead that actors’ agency was enabled by their embeddedness. Ambiguity, heterogeneity and multiplicity are properties of structure as a medium of action, while strategic responses also (re)produce or change this structure. Each of these affordances enables a broader repertoire of actions:
ambiguity offers multiple interpretations to draw upon; heterogeneity offers multiple constituents
to appeal to; and multiplicity offers multiple beliefs and norms with potentially contrasting implications. The embeddedness of innovating actors allows them to exploit these affordances to generate action alternatives. These findings illustrate that institutionally embedded agency has generative
potential.
Further, we find that affordances are enacted by embedded agents with reflexive capabilities
(Giddens, 1984). Micro-institutional affordances are not exogenous or inert, exerting causal influence over social agents, but instead properties of the micro-institutional system as enacted by
reflexive actors, and thus endogenous to the process of responding to legitimacy crises. Legitimacy
crises trigger reflexivity because they force actors to reflect upon the situation of their innovation
activities in the institutional environment. The experience of inconsistency in institutional elements may further trigger reflexivity (see Seo & Creed, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). This
reflexivity, in turn, is critical because innovating actors must envision the opportunities offered by
conditions of their institutional context, and be aware of implications for their innovation activities
and purposefully adjust them. Moreover, they may construe conditions that afford continuation of
their innovation activities by ambiguating institutionalized norms and beliefs; by emphasizing
multiplicity to seek tolerance, or by selecting heterogeneity relevant for the innovation issues at
stake. Reflexivity is thus endogenous to the processes of embedded agency in the face of a legitimacy crisis, because reflexivity is triggered by such a crisis but is also a necessary condition to
craft a situated response to it.
The connections between strategic responses and micro-institutional affordances uncovered in
our study are likely to depend on the aspirations of actors. Actors in our study were primarily concerned with continuing their radical innovation trajectory. For them, heterogeneity offered opportunities to select a corner of the institutional context more supportive of their innovation. Yet, in
other studies, the presence of competing demands from multiple institutional constituents has been
presented as a dilemma to be overcome (see Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009).
Similarly, whereas Oliver (1991) argued that environmental uncertainty stimulates organizations to
conform to established institutional logics, our findings suggest that ambiguity provides opportunities for transformation. Innovating actors do not seek to avoid uncertainty, but rather to identify and
exploit it in order to proceed with their innovation. Thus, the role of the affordances identified in
our study may depend on the objectives of the actors involved. This suggests that one way forward
for recent work on the repertoire of institutional work (Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009; Lawrence
et al., 2009) is to examine how alternative objectives affect how embedded agents can exploit
affordances.
Finally, our findings raise challenging issues for the management of innovation. Can institutional templates ever be as supportive for radical innovation as Vermeulen et al. (2007) found for
incremental service innovation? The radical projects investigated were embedded in experienced
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organizations with espoused commitment to radical innovation and dedicated organizational structures; yet these projects faced threats because they did not fit with widely shared beliefs, norms and
interests. This suggests that structures can only be part of the solution to enable radical innovation,
to be complemented by the agency of innovating actors. Novel concepts proposed in innovation management literature, such as ambidextrous organizations that separate exploratory innovation and exploitation of current businesses (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), may be beneficial by
creating heterogeneity and ambiguity, but agency is essential to enact and leverage such affordances
and make innovation happen.
A limitation of this study is that it is largely retrospective, which may limit the accuracy and
completeness of data, in particular on reflective processes from the early phases of the innovation
histories. Real-time investigation of radical innovation trajectories may extend the present study by
exploring how strategic responses are crafted over time and interact with the interpretation and
re-interpretation of micro-institutional affordances. Another limitation that calls for further research
is that we only examined projects and instances where legitimacy crises were overcome to uncover
how successful strategic responses were possible (see Mohr, 1982). Future research on failed projects and unsuccessful attempts to overcome legitimacy crises may provide complementary theoretical insight. Moreover, future research may also revisit incremental innovation to examine
whether similar dynamics may be found in case incremental innovation runs into legitimacy
crises.
The central question in our study has been how does radical technological innovation take place
successfully within established institutional systems. Our findings show that existing institutional
structures may pose constraints to radical innovation projects, even within organizations experienced in innovation. Although the search for more effective structures should not be discouraged,
our findings point at the complementary and vital role of human agency in the pursuit of radical
innovation. Moreover, this paper showed how embedded agency is possible because of affordances
within institutional structures. Thus, this paper extends institutional theory toward a microinstitutional perspective on radical innovation, providing a robust explanation of both institutional
stability and radical change.
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